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Recent studies have provided information on usage of Enterprise Security Architecture and related 
risk and security controls in a Cloud Computing environment in general, but less concerning the 
deployment of Enterprise Security Architecture within a Software As A Service Cloud Computing 
service model.  
The purpose of this study is to explore to what extent Enterprise Security Architecture can be used 
to map/model risk and security controls in a Software As A Service Cloud Computing service model 
from a Cloud Service Customer point of view.  
To answer this research question, an exploratory and descriptive, holistic multi-case study approach 
was adopted. Data is collected by conducting a combined method of survey and semi-structured 
interview with key stakeholders of selected Small and Medium sized Enterprises. 
Research findings show that Cloud Service Providers will cover many aspects of physical, 
infrastructure, and application security elements while Cloud Service Customers remains responsible 
for certain areas of security and control like compliance, user access and data. Cloud Service 
Customers can use Enterprise Security Architecture to manage the areas of security and risk control 
for which they remain responsible, although Enterprise Security Architecture is only used to a very 
limited extend within Small and Medium sized Enterprises. 
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Risk and security controls are high priority within enterprises. Currently a lot of organizations are 
using CC concepts or are interested in using them, but it is not clear what the impact is on the 
Enterprise Security Architecture (ESA) and how this should reflect the risk and security controls. 
During the research we investigated to what extent ESA can be used to map/model risk and security 
controls in a Software As A Service (SAAS) Cloud Computing (CC) service model from a Cloud Service 
Customer (CSC) point of view. This research was limited to the SAAS CC service model within Small 
and Midsize Enterprises (SME).    
From literature research we found that literature on this topic was mostly based on CC in general. 
Only limited literature was found on this topic with regards to the SAAS CC service model 
specifically. Based on the literature research outcome, a limited set of risk- and security elements 
were deducted for further investigation. In addition, our research only found a limited number of 
documents on the topic of the deployment of ESA for modelling/mapping risk and security related 
elements in a SAAS CC service model. 
The follow up research was based on a concurrent mixed method approach. The use of the mixed 
method allowed both sets of results to be interpreted together, which provided a richer and more 
comprehensive response to the research question in comparison to the use of a mono method 
design. In addition, the mixed method was used in order to combine data to ascertain if the findings 
from one method mutually corroborate the findings from the other method. 
From results it was recognized that researched SMEs did not hesitate in using SAAS applications, as 
they relied on the compliance information from the SAAS providers. SAAS applications did have 
policies and guidelines for authorization, authentication and identification, but there were also some 
exceptions. Confidence in the availability of the SAAS application was high, but there was no up to 
date insights in vulnerabilities and threats. There was no insight in the technical and logical 
architecture of the SAAS application. This was limited to encryption and security protocols only. 
Researched SMEs showed that there was no ESA governance setup and that there was only a limited 
budget available for security and risk issues. 
SAAS Customers should use ESA to identify the risks of utilizing the SAAS service model. Trust of the 
SAAS customer in the area of compliance of SAAS providers is high, but no ESA is in place to check 
and confirm on this trust. The CSC can use ESA artifacts, such as tools and methods to guarantee and 
monitor compliance. SAAS customers have confidence in authentication and identification methods, 
but these are not always secure enough. This has an impact on risk and security controls. 
Identification, authentication and authorization can be setup and monitored with ESA. SAAS 
customers have no up-to-date insights in security vulnerabilities and detected threats. They 
completely rely on the CSP (Cloud Service Provider) for monitoring and controlling, and ESA cannot 
be used from CSC point of view. SAAS customers have no insights in technical and logical 
architecture of SAAS applications architecture and they cannot gain insight in the possible 
vulnerabilities. The CSC can't use ESA to implement the controls needed to manage the security. 
These controls are the responsibility of the SAAS provider. ESA is deployed to a limited extent by the 
CSC. In none of the researched organizations there was a governance setup nor a dedicated security 




architect. A small budget for risk management and the limited use of ESA in general, prevents 
extensive deployment of ESA for a CSC in a SAAS CC service model.  
Both, CSP and the CSC, have shared responsibility in securing the cloud and minimizing the risk, but 
shared responsibility does not mean less responsibility. CSPs will cover many aspects of physical, 
infrastructure, and application security while CSCs remains responsible for certain areas of security 
and control like compliance, user access and data. CSCs can use ESA to manage the areas of security 
and risk control for which they remain responsible. But the current limited use of ESA within SMEs 
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The introduction of Cloud Computing (CC) transformed the traditional IT landscape. CC changes the 
way IT is provisioned and used. CC has many advantages and can lower the barriers for IT 
innovation.  
 
Some of the benefits of CC are avoiding big initial investments for hardware and software 
acquisition, reduction of operational and maintenance costs, achieving better capacity utilization, 
pay per use, high availability of various software applications and achieving business agility 
(Motahari-Nezhad, Stephenson, and Singhal 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the concept of CC brings many challenges and changes to the notion of system 
and data with regards to geographical distribution and control of the IT landscape. These challenges 
and changes relate to different topics like data governance, service management, process 
monitoring, infrastructure reliability, information security, data integrity and business continuity 
(Mahmood 2011). Moving a company's sensitive data into the hands of cloud providers expands and 
complicates the risk landscape in which the organization operates (Tang and Liu 2015). 
 
Enterprise Architecture (EA), including Enterprise Security Architecture (ESA), is all about aligning 
business systems and supporting information systems to realize business goals in an effective and 
efficient manner. One of the important aspects of an EA is risk regarding information security and 
the way this can be managed. This research focuses on the role that ESA can play in determining the 
impact of risk and security within a CC environment. 
In the next section of this chapter, we will explore the research area, the problem statement, the 








According to NIST, CC is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to 
a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction (Mell and Grance 2011). This cloud model is composed of five essential 
characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models. The essential characteristics of 
CC are on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and 
measured service. The different service models for CC are Software As A Service (SAAS), Platform As 
A Service (PAAS) and Infrastructure As A Service (IAAS).  
 
 






Figure 1 Cloud Computing service models 
 
Deployment of CC is done via different models:  
Private cloud, where the cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a single organization 
comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business units). Community cloud, where the cloud 
infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a specific community of consumers from 
organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and 
compliance considerations). Public cloud, where the cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use 
by the general public. Hybrid cloud, where the cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more 
distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities, but are 
bound together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application 
portability. 
 
Enterprise Architecture & security 
 
According to (Ahlemann, Stettiner, Messerschmidt, and Legner 2012), architecture is defined as the 
‘fundamental organization of a system, embodied in its components, their relationships to each 
other and the environment, and the principles governing its design’. EA is therefore understood as 
the fundamental organization of an enterprise as a socio-technical system, along with the principles 
governing its design and development. An EA includes all relevant components for describing an 
enterprise, including its business and operating model, organizational structure, business processes, 
data, applications and technology. EA’s design rules provide stipulations for the development and 
structuring of the components, as well as a means to ensure consistency in the use of components 
and in their relationships. EAM (Enterprise Architecture Management) enables EA. EAM is defined 
as: “A management practice that establishes, maintains, and uses a coherent set of guidelines, 
architecture principles and governance regimes that provide direction for and practical help with the 
design and development of an enterprise’s architecture in order to achieve a vision and a strategy” 
(Ahlemann et al. 2012). Moving a company's sensitive data into the hands of cloud providers 
expands and complicates the risk landscape in which the organization operates (Tang and Liu 2015). 
 
EA includes security architecture and is all about aligning business systems and supporting 
information systems to realize business goals in an effective and efficient manner (systems being the 
combination of processes, people, and technology). One of the important aspects of an EA is risk 
regarding information security and the way this can be managed. For too long, information security 




has been considered a separate discipline, isolated from the EA (The Open Group, 2011). To be able 
to guarantee quality of service a structured information systems security architecture needs to be in 
place (Sherwood, Clark, and Lynas 2005). 
 
1.3. Problem statement 
 
CC is seeing an adoption and adaption across the globe. The CC idea is actually a smart and sensible 
combination of several proven and promising technologies (Mahmood & Hill, 2011).  
Bringing cloud capabilities to an enterprise is about more than just the latest technology. it is about 
changing the traditional business and collaboration model with partners, customers, and providers 
of services to the enterprise. It is much more important for companies to understand the changing 
trends in business and their impacts on EA than to just implement the next “hot” technology 
product. The enterprise architect has a lot to do in helping enterprises define the best strategy to 
leverage the blooming and booming cloud models. Organizations are interested in using cloud 
solutions, but they are not clear on the impact on the EA. Enterprise Architects are being forced to 
tailor EA towards cloud-based solutions (Mahmood & Hill, 2011). And at the end this has to be done 
in a way that will minimize risk and maximize security for the organization. 
Some of the main potential risks and security issues of CC within the enterprise are (Naresh Kumar, 
Pramod Chandra p, and John M 2020): 
1. You lose direct knowledge and control of underlying hardware  
2. Virtual Machine sharing the same hardware can affect your performance  
3. Hard to diagnose performance issues, due to limited visibility and virtualization 
4. Potential security risks of placing your mission critical data on remote servers 
5. Vendor lock-in, means getting stuck with a Cloud provider who has your data 
 
The general issue is that ESA mainly models only those computing and business components which 
are under the control of the enterprise. The characteristics and the business dynamics of CC have 
certainly changed the way enterprises use information systems. This requires enterprises tying their 
ESA together with the service characteristics of CC. 
 
1.4. Research objective and questions 
 
CC affects the EA (including the ESA) of an organization because part of the computer system 
resources is moved from within the organization to a cloud environment. This can be considered as a 
kind of “outsourcing”. One of the challenges here is to find a suitable architecture method that 
matches the characteristics of CC, such as the lack of direct knowledge and control of underlying 
hardware, managing visibility on performance and monitoring potential security risks and controls. 
The question is whether there are ESA frameworks that connect to this, and to what extent the 
existing ESA frameworks meet the cloud-specific conditions. 
 
Goal of assignment/research: 
In this research the impact of CC on the ESA is investigated. Risk and security implications result from 
the utilization of cloud-based solutions, and can be captured in the ESA. Goal of this research is to 
provide insight into the way in which ESA can be deployed for the adoption of a CC model. The focus 
of this research will be on SAAS, because SAAS is representing the largest cloud market and is also 




considered to be the largest market segment for growth. Another reason to focus on only one cloud 
service model is the limited time available for conducting the research.  
The research was conducted from a Cloud Service Customer (CSC) point of view. 
 
 
Main research question: 
To what extent can ESA be used to map/model risk and security controls in a SAAS CC service model.  
To be able to answer the main research question we need to investigate and answer following sub 
research questions: 
1. Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of using the SAAS CC service model on risk 
and security controls.   
2. Research Question 2 (RQ2): How is ESA being deployed in a SAAS CC service model. 
 
1.5. Motivation/relevance  
 
Risk and security controls are high priority within enterprises. Currently a lot of organizations are 
using CC concepts or are interested in using them, but it is not clear what the impact is on the ESA 
and how this should reflect the risk and security controls. As enterprises adopt Cloud-based 
solutions, more issues must be addressed and that makes ESA more complex. Enterprise Architects 
are being forced to tailor ESA towards Cloud-based solutions (Mahmood & Hill, 2011). Risk and 
security controls therefore need to be included as part of the ESA design for CC.  
 
 
1.6. Main lines of approach 
 
The steps that are followed to execute the research are handled in different chapters:  
In Chapter 2 the theoretical framework is discussed and the sub-questions are investigated and 
answered.  
Chapter 3 deals with the strategy, method and technique being used in the practical part of the 
research. 
Chapter 4 contains the results of the practical research.  
Chapter 5 contains the conclusion, discussion and recommendations. Finally in this chapter a 
reflection is given on the execution of the process for this research.  




2. Theoretical framework 
 
This chapter reviews the literature available on the use of the SAAS CC model and reflection of risk 
and security controls in the ESA. Based on this literature review the research approach, 
implementation, results and conclusions, objective and follow-up research are described.  
 
2.1. Research approach 
 
First of all, systematic literature search is used to find scientific literature on the use of risk and 
security controls within CC, and the possible impact on the ESA.  
Because it was expected that there is a limited amount of literature to be found that has been peer-
reviewed, also not-peer-reviewed articles have been searched for. This increased the chance of 
finding relevant information. The disadvantage is that not-peer-reviewed articles may lack a 
significant quality standard.  
 
Search engines used: 
 
Search engine Entity URL 
Google Scholar Google Inc. https://scholar.google.nl/ 
University Library Open Universiteit http://bibliotheek.ou.nl 
 
The following search parameters were used in the queries of the different search engines. 
 
Search queries parameters: 
Parameter Value 
Language Dutch, English 
Search area enterprise security 
architecture, cloud computing, 
SAAS, security 
Date of publication 2012 - present 
Type of Literature Scientific, books, conference 
papers, master/PhD theses 
Literature exclusion Newspaper articles, book 
reviews 
 
Only literature from 2012 – 2020 (present) is used for executing the search queries that are relevant 
for the literature research.  
Furthermore, the snowballing method was used to find relevant literature. By using backward 
snowballing, it was possible to find literature by using a key document, and from there consult 
referenced documents. The disadvantage of this method is that it is searching retrospectively, so 
each source you find will be older than the previous one.  
By using forward snowballing, it was possible to find documents referring to the key document 
(“cited by”).  
The advantage of the snowballing method is that you are searching in a focused way. This increases 












Various combinations of search terms are used in the parameters for literature search and within 
the search engine. The main search is on ESA in combination with Cloud Computing (SAAS). Then a 
further focus is set to the area of security.  
 
 
Figure 2 Overview of search queries and results 
 
There are three characteristics that determine whether or not a document was used for literature 
research:  
• the relevance to the main question and sub-questions 
• the recency of the document 
• the quality of the document  
 
The following steps were carried out: 
 
1. Inventory phase: determine the relevance of a document on the basis of the title and short 
description and drop the document if the relevance is deemed too low. 
2. Global scan phase: determine the relevance of the documents found from step 1 based on 
the introduction, conclusion and a global scan. 
3. In-depth scan phase: Select the documents after affirmatively answering the questions: 
a. Did the information answer (part of) my research question? 
b. Did the information provide a good picture of the research topic? 
c. Did the quality and level of the information match my needs? 
d. Was there an overview of the sources used (bibliography)? 
 
Only the documents remaining after step 3 were used for the literature research. 
 
Some of the search queries gave a very large number of results. During search the search queries 
were optimized by using additional parameters: 




• use more specific search terms 
• add an extra search term to the search query (AND) 
• search in specific search fields (title words, keywords) 
• use limiters (e.g., between specific years, or peer-reviewed articles only) 
• search for an exact phrase (use double quotation marks) 
In Google Scholar the distinction whether articles were peer-reviewed or not, was not clear. In some 
cases, titles of relevant articles, found via this search engine, have also been entered into the online 
library of the Open Universiteit, in order to determine whether they were peer-reviewed.  
 
2.3. Results and conclusions 
 
To be able to answer this main research question we first need to investigate and answer the 
following sub research questions: 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of using the SAAS CC service model on risk and 
security controls. 
By using SAAS the customer is not able to manage and control the cloud infrastructure but is only 
able to configure some specific application parameters (Bouchaala, Ghazel, Saidane, and Kamoun 
2017:303–10). The adoption of SAAS has some barriers, and one of the most significant barriers is 
security, followed by issues regarding compliance, privacy and legal matters  (Hashizume, Rosado, 
Fernández-Medina, and Fernandez 2013). (Modi, Patel, Borisaniya, Patel, and Rajarajan 2013) 
concluded that since cloud services are delivered using classical network protocols and formats over 
the Internet, implicit vulnerabilities existing in these protocols, as well as threats introduced by 
newer architectures, raise many security and privacy concerns. Also (Niu, Liu, Zhang, Lü, and Li 2016) 
concluded that the number of security vulnerabilities in the cloud is more than in traditional 
enterprise services. (Sun 2018) mentions that SAAS introduces a new series of security concerns in 
three main security dimensions: computer security, network security and information security, and 
synthesizes a number of vital vulnerabilities and threats. Alam, S., Muqeem, M., & Khan, S. A. (Alam, 
Muqeem, and Khan 2018) use a classification model for identifying SAAS security issues and the 
relationship between vulnerabilities, attacks and threats. The impact of using SAAS on security and 
risk is significant and has been researched over the past years.  
The search of the literature revealed that the number of security vulnerabilities and threats for SAAS 
is higher than for traditional enterprise services. The search of the literature also revealed limited 
attention has been paid to additional root causes that can have an impact on risk and security 
controls in SAAS environments, like vendor lock-in, jurisdiction/location of data and the use of SLAs.  
Following risk and security key-elements have been deducted from the literature research (RQ1): 
 
Nr Element Source 
1 Compliance (Modi et al. 2013), (Rath, Spasic, Boucart, and Thiran 2019), 
(Hashizume et al. 2013) 
2 Regulation (Modi et al. 2013),(Rath et al. 2019), (Hashizume et al. 2013) 
3 Identification (Bouchaala et al. 2017), (Rath et al. 2019)  
4 Authentication (Bouchaala et al. 2017), (Rath et al. 2019) 
5 Authorization (Bouchaala et al. 2017), (Rath et al. 2019) 






(Hashizume et al. 2013), (Rath et al. 2019) 
7 Administration (Hashizume et al. 2013), (Rath et al. 2019) 
8 Architecture (Mahmood and Hill 2011), (Rath et al. 2019) 
Table 1 risk and security elements 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): How is ESA being deployed in a SAAS CC service model. 
According to (Newcombe 2020) and (Hashizume et al. 2013) security is paramount in making the 
SAAS CC model successful. (Newcombe 2020) indicates that there are several benefits for 
implementing an ESA but that implementation should also handle responsibility for application 
security between customer and provider. (Hashizume et al. 2013) states that in a SAAS service model 
many more security services are delivered by the cloud service provider than in a IAAS or PAAS cloud 
service model. This is because of the degree of abstraction level (see Figure 1). The SaaS model is 
based on a higher degree of integrated functionality with minimal customer control. (Sherwood et 
al. 2005) developed a methodology for developing risk-driven enterprise information security and 
information assurance architectures that support critical business initiatives. It is an open standard, 
comprising a number of frameworks, models, methods and processes and can be aligned with cloud 
security standards such as ENISA (The European Commission 2020) , NIST (Nieles, Dempsey, and 
Pillitteri 2017) and CSA (Mogull, Arlen, Gilbert, Lane, Mortman, Peterson, and Rothman 2009) 
(Mahmood 2011) (Gonzalez, Miers, Redígolo, Carvalho, Simplicio, Näslund, and Pourzandi 2011). The 
CSA is considered as one of the most renown alliances for cloud security standards (Caballero 2020). 
The CSA Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) is a security control framework for CC, composed of control 
objectives that are structured in different domains, covering all key aspects of the cloud technology. 
The controls framework is aligned to the CSA Security Guidance v4 (Mogull et al. 2009) and is 
currently considered a de-facto standard for cloud security assurance and compliance. (Rath et al. 
2019) are using a five-step approach, starting with security requirements identification to security 
pattern classification. This pattern approach is a more comprehensive way of addressing security 
topics for CC. Another approach is mentioned by the National Cyber Security Center (Nationaal 
Cyber Security Center 2012) where a framework has been drawn up from a security point of view 
and describes specific security elements for CC. 
There are different standards and security control frameworks that can be utilized for architecting 
security in CC environments, however from this literature review it is not recognized if there are 
specific ones for the SAAS model, how they differ from other cloud models and if they are utilized.  
 
 Our literature research only found a limited number of documents on the topic of the deployment 
of ESA for modelling/mapping risk and security related elements in a SAAS CC service model. Recent 
studies confirm that there is a currently lacking theoretical body of knowledge on EA-driven 
information security management practices and their practical implications that should be generally 
applicable (Larno, Seppänen, and Nurmi 2019).  
This research also investigates the subject of how ESA is being deployed in a SAAS CC service model 
(RQ2). 
 
2.4. Objective of the follow-up research 
 
The topic of security is one of the top concerns with regards to CC. Security is often the main “brake” 
for migrating to a CC model (Bouchaala et al. 2017:303). 




The researched literature focusses on general cloud security and deployment of ESA in a SAAS 
model, and mainly addresses limited topics, such as authentication, authorization and 
threat/vulnerabilities, and often ignores some other security related issues such as vendor lock-in, 
jurisdiction/location, operations management and governance. Despite the fragmented picture and 
the conclusions on the different research sub-questions, the combined content of the various 
articles provides a justified reason for the continuation of the research.  
This follow-up research will give an insight in the use of ESA in a SAAS CC environment with regards 
to security and risk control, and the deployment of ESA in a SAAS CC service model. 
  






This chapter describes the approach and purpose of the research. In addition, this chapter describes 
the strategy, method, technique and required resources. Finally, validity, reliability and ethical 
aspects are discussed. 
 
3.1. Conceptual design: select the research method(s) 
 
Saunders defines five research purposes/studies (Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2019:186–88): 
 
1. Exploratory studies 
2. Descriptive studies 
3. Explanatory studies 
4. Evaluative studies 
5. Combined studies 
 
Because it is not yet clear how elements of ESA is used for SAAS CC, the research is exploratory and 
descriptive in nature. No hypothesis is formulated here. The aim is to find out what actually happens 
around the use of ESA and risk and security controls, in combination with the SAAS model. As a 
result of this practical research approach, a clear picture may emerge on basis of which we can 
address the descriptive part of this research. This study falls into the category of combined studies  
(Saunders et al. 2019:189–211). 
 
The empirical research had to meet the following selection criteria: 
 
1. The method was used to gain insights in the use of the researched risk and security elements 
for SAAS CC, and the degree of deployment of ESA in a SAAS CC model 
2. The method was suitable for research on the defined elements and to corroborate on the 
statements made 
3. The method could be implemented within six months (duration of the graduation process) 
 
In alignment with above criteria, a concurrent mixed method research was conducted. Concurrent 
mixed methods research involves the separate use of quantitative and qualitative methods within a 
single phase of data collection and analysis (Saunders et al. 2019:182). This allows both sets of 
results to be interpreted together to provide a richer and more comprehensive response to the 
research question in comparison to the use of a mono method design (Saunders et al. 2019:182). 
Also, the mixed method may be used in order to combine data to ascertain if the findings from one 
method mutually corroborate the findings from the other method (Saunders et al. 2019:185).  
Given the limited time frame, the outburst of the coronavirus pandemic, and the complex and multi-
faced nature of the selected SMEs, an inductive holistic multi-case study research approach was 
adopted. Such an approach is holistic because it covers one SME as a single entity. The unit of 
analysis was the SME. 
 
 




3.2. Technical design: elaboration of the method 
 
Because of the usage of mixed methods, this elaboration was done for 2 methods: quantitative 
method and qualitative method. Both methods are using the same dimensions. 
 
Dimensions 
The eight elements that were deducted from the literature research for RQ1 have been merged into 
four main groups, called dimensions. A dimension represents the elements that logically can be 
linked together and can be handled as one subject during survey/interview sessions. 
Dimensions for RQ1: 
• Compliance and Regulation (RQ1) 
• Identification, Authentication and Authorization (RQ1) 
• Operational maintenance and Administration (RQ1) 
• Architecture (RQ1) 
On top of these four dimensions an additional dimension was added for the subject that was 
deducted from the literature research for RQ2: 
• Deployment of ESA in a SAAS service model (RQ2) 
 
Quantitative method: 
The Quantitative research method part is used to gather information through numerical data. 
Quantitative research examines relationships between variables, which are measured numerically 
and analyzed using a range of statistical and graphical techniques (Saunders et al. 2019:178).  It is 
used to quantify the opinions.  
The use of this method made it easier and faster for respondents to answer by making use of a 
limited set of pre-defined answers (closed questions). This method also made it easier for the 
analyst because answers could be quantified (numerical data). Due to the limited number of 
respondents, this method ensured that more "homogeneous" answers could be obtained, which 
could therefore be compared across the different cases. 
For the quantitative part a survey collected data from a number of resources (Saunders et al. 
2019:181). The survey has a pre-determined set of closed questions.  
The survey structure is as follows: 
The survey took place based on the researched dimensions. For each researched dimension a limited 
number of closed questions was defined. In addition a score template (Appendix E) was defined to 
quantify the answers. The numerical score of each question is corrected with a weight indicator to 
ensure that each dimension is equally valued. 
 
Qualitative method: 
The Qualitative research method part is used to gather non-numerical data. In the qualitative 
research, meanings are derived from words and images, not numbers. Since words and images may 




have multiple meanings as well as unclear meanings, it is often necessary to explore and clarify these 
with participants. Methods used are unstructured or semi-structured.  (Saunders et al. 2019:179). 
Theme identification is one of the most fundamental tasks in qualitative research (Ryan and Bernard 
2003).  
 
For the qualitative part the data collection was done via semi-structured interviews. A semi-
structured interview was more appropriate because with an unstructured interview it is difficult to 
get answers on the specific research questions.  
 
Concurrent mixed method: 
Because of the use of the concurrent mixed method, the data collection (survey and interview) took 
place at the same time.  
Participants in the survey/interview session had to be acquainted with utilization of ESA, SAAS and 
risk- and security controls within their organization. Together with a manager of the organization a 
respondent was appointed.  
The participants were informed in advance and were able to prepare and plan for the 
survey/interview session. In this way it was also possible to align with  restrictions due to corona 
pandemic and make optimal use of their limited availability. 
Survey/interview execution steps: 
1. Introduction 
2. Explanation of structure (survey versus interview) 
3. Conducting survey/interview: discussion based on survey/interview questionaire  
4. Verification: verification of interview findings with survey score  
5. Closure 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
 
Quantitative data analysis 
During the survey/interview session, the interview protocol (appendix C) was leading. Survey and 
interview questions were asked in accordance with the protocol, and the response was noted down 
for the survey as well as the interview questions. In case a question could not be answered 
sufficiently, the interviewer tried to elaborate on the question in order to get the necessary 
information. If the respondent agreed, then the interview was recorded with audio equipment. For 
each survey/interview a report was created. The report was an accurate interpretation of the 
information that was collected from the respondent during the survey/interview. The report was 
sent to the respondent for final verification. During the verification period the respondent could give 
feedback. Based on the feedback the report was reviewed and adjusted. 
The data of the survey was analyzed by using a score template including a scale- and a weight 
indicator. The scale indicator was setup per question and was based on a Likert-type scale (Saunders 
et al. 2019:528). In this case it was decided to use a 2-point (no neutral option) and a 3-point 
(including neutral option) pre-defined scale to avoid a choice overload and because of the fact that 
selected respondents didn't have extensive information on every researched topic.   




The weight indicator was setup per dimension and distributes the weight of the questions in an 
equal way across the dimension. Survey questions were setup to represent the same level of detail. 
Therefore, each question has also the same weight within a dimension. The number of questions per 
dimension may vary. A weight is assigned to each question per dimension, so that the number of 
questions does not affect the score of a dimension. 
Detailed information for the quantitative analysis can be found in Appendix F. 
 
Qualitative data analysis 
Our approach for deriving themes during the qualitative research was based on the technique of 
finding similarities and differences (Ryan and Bernard 2003:91).  This technique is used in cases 
where there is textual data, verbatim text, no rich narrative, and only brief descriptions (Ryan and 
Bernard 2003:102).  
To find similarities and differences in the textual data from the interviews, we used a Natural 
Language Processing (NLP) method for approximating how similar two texts are: cosine similarity 
(Tan, Steinbach, and Kumar 2005:500).  
 
NLP refers to the branch of computer science concerned with giving computers the ability to 
understand text and spoken words in much the same way human beings can. In NLP the calculations 
are performed on numeric representations (vectors) of text objects.  
Cosine similarity is a widely implemented metric in information retrieval and related studies. This 
metric models a text as a vector of terms and the similarity between two texts is derived from cosine 
value between two texts' term vectors (Rahutomo, Kitasuka, and Aritsugi 2012).  
To compute the cosine similarity between interview responses we used functions provided by the 
spaCy NLP library. spaCy is a free open-source library for Natural Language Processing in the Python 
programming language. spaCy provides languages models (learned from large collections of text) to 
find semantic related words or sentences in text. 
We have written a Python program that reads an excel file with the interview answers of all 
respondents, calculates the similarity of the answers and adds the results of the calculations to the 
excel file. 
Since cosine similarity can only be calculated for two vectors, we calculated the similarity between 
the respondents' answers for each question in pairs. This resulted in 3 pairs of similarity calculation: 
interview 1/2, interview 1/3 and interview 2/3, represented in the analysis excel file by the three 
columns Spacy12, Spacy13 and Spacy23. 
When the calculated cosine similarity is greater than 0.66, the spreadsheet cell is colored green, 
indicating that we have a high degree of similarity. When the calculated cosine similarity is less than 
0.33, the spreadsheet cell is colored red, indicating that similarity is low. If the calculated cosine 
similarity is between 0.33 and 0.66, the spreadsheet cell will be colored yellow, indicating that there 
is some similarity.  
 
In the analysis excel file the column similarities/differences represents the degree of 
similarity/difference as a final result. In case of one or more red colored spaCy columns the 
similarities/differences column will be colored red to indicate a difference. In case of a combination 
of green and yellow spaCy columns, the similarities/differences column will be colored green to 
indicate a similarity. In case of only yellow spaCy columns, the similarities/differences column will be 
colored white to indicate a low similarity. 
  
In the following Figure you will find an extract of the python code used for processing the spaCy 
library.   




# Load large Dutch language model of spaCy  and assign the model to the variable “nlp_nl”: 
 nlp_nl = spacy.load('nl_core_news_lg') 
# Process sentences A and B with the language model to convert the sentences to vectors: 
 vector_A = nlp_nl(sentence_A) 
 vector_B = nlp_nl(sentence_B) 
# Compute the cosine similarity for vectors A and B: 
similarity = vector_A.similarity(vector_B)    
Figure 3 Extract of Python code using the spaCy library 
Looking at the degree of similarity, we can formulate and appoint themes that are important (or 
appear to be completely unimportant) for all respondents. 
Detailed information for the qualitative analysis can be found in Appendix F. 
 
 
3.4. Reflection w.r.t. validity, reliability and ethical aspects 
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity refers to the extent that findings can be attributed to the intervention that is 
researched rather than to flaws in the research design: does the research actually investigates what 
is intended to be investigated (Saunders et al. 2019:215).  
Data is collected and analyzed through survey and interviews in order to come to the final results. In 
this context, the following actions are taken: 
• A test interview was held to check if the setup of the combined method (survey and semi-
structured interview) was comprehensible, and to confirm that the right questions were 
being asked. 
• To prevent the respondents from saying less than they would like it is pledged that the 
results are anonymous. Only roles (function title) are mentioned in the reports. 
• At the time of scheduling the interviews, the purpose of the research is explained and 
background information is provided. In this way respondents are informed in advance and 
they have the opportunity to prepare for the interview. 
• All respondents had similar relevant experience in the researched area.  
 
External validity  
The external validity is concerned with the question if the research findings can be generalized to 
other contexts (Saunders et al. 2019:216).  As this research is conducted within a small number of 
organizations it will have a limited score on external validity.  
By describing the research in terms of context, design and outcomes, it is possible to asses the 









Construct validity refers to the extent to which a set of questions actually measures the presence of 
the construct you intended them to measure (Saunders et al. 2019:517).  
Measures taken to maximize construct validity: 
• Survey/interview is conducted within the case organization on basis of a predefined protocol 
for surveying/interviewing.  
• Respondents receive information in advance to prepare for the survey/interview 
• Data that is collected through survey/interview is clustered per research dimension  
• after creating the survey/interview report with results, the respondent is given a period of 
time to give feedback on the survey/interview results and the interpretation of the 
researcher.  
• All steps as described above will be documented in the report. 
• The chosen research method could be validated based on the findings of the respondents 
(do respondents confirm that the chosen method is a valid method for collecting data within 
the organization, do the results obtained reflect the situation within the organization). 
 
Reliability 
In the context of reliability, it is important that the research must be replicable by other researchers  
(Saunders et al. 2019:213). The following measures are taken to enable replication of the study: 
• The data that is retrieved from the survey and interview is obtained with the consent of the 
respondent and summarized in the interview reports. After receiving the report, the 
respondent is given a period of time to provide feedback. This feedback may result in 
adjustment of the report. 
• During this research we consulted different persons for collection of relevant data. 
•  Respondents from different companies are interviewed individually to ensure that company 




Following measures were applied to safeguard research ethics (Saunders et al. 2019:6.6): 
• The respondents voluntarily participate in the interview. 
• The respondents are informed that they are not obliged to answer. 
• The data used and processed cannot be traced back to the respondents. 
• The data used and processed cannot be traced back to the organization. 
• During the research, we work in accordance with the “wet bescherming persoonsgegevens 
(AVG)” and the Dutch Code of Conduct for Scientific Practice. 
 
Limitations: 
The research certainly also has some limitations: 
• To validate the findings on a larger scale, the research could be further expanded and 
broadened with additional associated risk and security elements.  




• The survey would also be more reliable with a higher number of respondents and 














This section describes the implementation of the research and discusses the outcome obtained 
through the research. The scores are linked to the outcome of the survey questions (Appendix E). 
The results are linked to the different themes (T1/T31) that have been extracted from the qualitative 
data analysis phase (Appendix F). Per theme the number of occurrences was registered to indicate 
the “importance” of a theme (Appendix G). Themes that have four or more occurrences are marked 
in green color.   
 
4.1. Case organizations 
 
Because of unplanned circumstances (corona pandemic) only a limited number of case organizations 
(three) and related respondents (three) could be identified. An overview of participating case 
organizations can be found in appendix A. An overview of respondents can be found in appendix B. 
The selection of respondents is aligned with management of the case organization and is based on 
objective criteria, such as the knowledge of information technology in general and the knowledge in 
the area of ESA, SAAS and risk- and security controls within their organization. 
All three case organizations are SME organizations (T1). All respondents have a clear understanding 
of the definitions for ESA, CC and SAAS (T2). For all case organizations the goals for ESA are 
formalized (T3). All organizations had core business applications that were delivered via the SAAS 
service model (T6, T15) and different risk and security controls were implemented (T7). 
 




Data collection has partly been conducted by using closed questions survey. Due to the corona 
pandemic and strict regulations all surveys were executed online via Microsoft Teams. Each survey 
session was planned for 1 hour (combined with interview questions).  
The best possible survey score that a respondent could achieve for each dimension was 100%. A 
score of 100% indicates that maturity of the selected dimension in terms of minimizing SAAS related 
risk and security problems is very high. The lowest possible score that a respondent could achieve 
for each dimension was 0%. A score of 0% indicates that maturity of the selected dimension in terms 










Data collection has partly been conducted by using semi-structured interviews. Due to the corona 
pandemic and strict regulations all interviews were executed online via Microsoft Teams. Each 




In this section the results of the survey and semi-structured interviews are presented. This section 
will also provide evidence on the main research question and the sub-questions. 
The following sub-sections are structured according to the different dimensions that were deducted 
from the key elements (RQ1), and one additional dimension for the subject of deployment of ESA in 
a SAAS service model (RQ2). 
 
4.3.1. Compliance and Regulation 
 
In this section the score and results for the dimension compliance and regulation are presented. The 
score is presented in a table. In the table you will find the individual (total) scores as well as the 
combined (total) scores for the surveyed dimension. In addition, you will find the results from the 
semi-structured interviews.    
Score: 












1.1 Voldoet de SAAS-
oplossing(en) aan geldende 
wet- en regelgeving? 
Does the SAAS solution(s) 
comply with applicable 
laws and regulations? 
50% 50% 100% 66,7% 
1.2 Worden gegevens in de SAAS 
applicatie(s) uitsluitend 
gebruikt of verwerkt in 
overeenstemming met het 
oorspronkelijke beoogde 
doel? 
Is data in the SAAS 
application(s) used or 
processed solely in 
accordance with the 
original intended purpose? 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
1.3 Is de toegang tot gegevens 




Is access to data and data 
storage secured by 
prescribed encryption 
methods? 
50% 100% 50% 66,7% 
1 De SAAS oplossing voldoet 
aan compliance en 
regelgeving 
The SAAS solution 
complies with compliance 
and regulations 
66,7% 83,3% 83,3% 77,8% 
Table 2 Compliance and Regulation score 
Result: 
Legal and regulatory compliance was one of the priority issues for all case organizations when it 
came to security and risk of data access and storage in SAAS applications (T7). Legal and regulatory 
requirements and standards in different geographic regions/jurisdictions require data to be 




physically stored in a designated country/legal jurisdiction. For all respondents there is a high 
confidence that SAAS application comply with legal and regulatory requirements. Especially for the 
case organization that operated in healthcare area there were more strict requirements for access 
and data storage (T9) of medical information, but also here confidence was high. All case 
organizations (healthcare, accountancy, governmental) were subject to periodic audits (T10) and 
relied on the compliance information from the certified SAAS CSP (T11). All case organizations 
indicate that they are processing sensitive data (personal, financial, medical) which becomes a big 
problem when data is leaked (T5). 
 
All respondents confirmed that the data in the SAAS application is solely used in accordance with the 
original intended purpose (T12). In all case organizations the intended purpose was identified by 
management and written down in strategy documents (T3). This was needed to be in line with legal 
regulations. 
Access to data and data storage via encrypted methods was implemented for each case 
organization. But there was only a full coverage of encryption for one case organization. In case 
encryption is not secured sensitive data can be leaked (T5). 
 
 
4.3.2. Identification, Authentication and Authorization 
 
In this section the score and results for the dimension identification, authentication and 
authorization are presented. The score is presented in a table. In the table you will find the 
individual (total) scores as well as the combined (total) scores for the surveyed dimension. In 
addition, you will find the results from the semi-structured interviews.    
Score: 
















Should users of the SAAS 
application(s) authenticate 
themselves? 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
2.2 Kan de SAAS-applicatie(s) de 
identiteit van de gebruiker 
vaststellen? 
Can the SAAS 
application(s) determine 
the identity of the user? 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
2.3 Is er een beleid voor toegang 
en gebruikscontrole? 
 
Is there an access and 
usage control policy? 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
2 De SAAS oplossing voldoet 
aan identificatie, 
authenticatie en autorisatie 
vereisten 
 





83,3% 83,3% 83,3% 83,3% 
Table 3 Identification, Authentication and Authorization score 
Result: 
For all case organizations the way of electronic authentication of humans in a SAAS application was a 
problem (T13) and caused issues in the area of balancing between usability and security. All 
organizations used a combination of the traditional three factors: 




- something the user knows (user-id / secret password),  
- something the user has (physical possession) and  
- something that is a unique trait of the user (biometrics, for example smartphone fingerprint)  
The combination of all three factors provided a high level of security. In one organization for certain 
cases only the first factor (user-id/password) was used for authenticate with the a SAAS application. 
In most cases 2FA authentication was used in combination with a smartphone to access the SAAS 
application. All case organizations did use a registration policy (T14). 
Two case organizations confirmed that there were cases in which the identity could not be 
confirmed. In case authentication or identification is not secured this can lead to a sensitive data 
leak (T5). 
All of the case organizations had a policy and guidelines (T4) for access and usage of SAAS 
applications. The policy and guidelines were aligned with the configuration of the SAAS applications. 
In case of authorization (user permissions) failure, sensitive data can be leaked (T5). 
 
4.3.3. Operational maintenance and Administration 
 
In this section the score and results for the dimension operational maintenance and administration 
are presented. The score is presented in a table. In the table you will find the individual (total) scores 
as well as the combined (total) scores for the surveyed dimension. In addition, you will find the 
results from the semi-structured interviews.    
 
Score: 












3.1 Wordt de beschikbaarheid 
van de SAAS-applicatie(s) 
gegarandeerd?  
Is the availability of the 
SAAS application(s) 
guaranteed? 
50% 50% 100% 66,7% 




detected in the SAAS 
application(s)? 
n.a. n.a. 100% n.a. 
3.3 Wordt er gebruik gemaakt 
van SLAs die ook security 
elementen bevatten? 
 
Are there SLAs used that 
also include security 
elements? 
n.a. n.a. 100% n.a. 
3 Operationeel beheer en 
administratie voldoet aan 
vereisten 
Operational management 
and administration meet 
requirements 
50% 50% 100% 66,7% 
Table 4 Operational maintenance and Administration score 
In two cases we deleted two questions in our results (marked with n.a.) because the respondents 
were unable to answer the questions. As a result, the score might not give a correct indication of the 
average level of this dimension for the three case organizations.  
Result: 
Availability of SAAS applications was a crucial aspect for all case organizations (T15, T16). For two 
case organization there was a max score on guaranteeing SAAS availability, for one case organization 
this was limited to a certain amount of up-time (T27, T30). 




Within two case organizations it was not clear if there was any ability of detection of vulnerabilities 
that could impact SAAS applications (T17). In another case organization this was completely covered. 
In case vulnerabilities are not detected and repaired there is a risk for leakage of sensitive data (T5). 
In one case organization SLAs were used that also included security elements like uptime, 
vulnerability and threat monitoring. The other case organizations could not answer the question 
about security elements in the SLAs (T19). One respondent said that within his organization “it is not 
clear whether SLAs also include security elements”. 
Detected vulnerabilities are not immediately reported to the SAAS customer (T31). This can lead to 
unexpected leakage of sensitive data (T5). Customers also doubt whether providers inform them on 
short term about detected vulnerabilities or leaks (T18). 




In this section the score and results for the dimension architecture is presented. The score is 
presented in a table. In the table you will find the individual (total) scores as well as the combined 
(total) scores for the surveyed dimension. In addition, you will find the results from the semi-
structured interviews.    
 
Score: 












4.1 Heeft u een beeld van de 
architectuur van de SAAS-
applicatie(s)? 
 
Do you have a “picture” of 
the architecture of the 
SAAS application(s)? 
50%  0% 50%  33,3% 
4.2 Bezit de CSP certificaten voor 
de SAAS applicaties? 
 
Does the CSP hold 
certificates for the SAAS 
applications? 
50% 50% 100%  66,7% 




Is the SAAS application 
accessed via security 
protocols? 
100% 100%  100% 100% 
4 Architectuur is inzichtelijk 
 
Architecture has clear 
insights 
66,7% 50% 83,3%  66,7% 
Table 5 Architecture score 
Result: 
In all case organizations there only was a limited picture of architecture of the SAAS applications 
(T20). In two case organizations this was limited to a high-level overview of infrastructure and 
applications. In one case organization there was no insight at all. One respondent mentioned that 
“within a SAAS model the security architecture is handled by the provider of the application”. 
In all case organizations the CSP used certificates, but in two case organizations it was not clear what 
kind of certificates were used (T22, T28). In one of the case organizations the “PKI 
overheidscertificaten” were used. These certificates are compliant with specific governmental 




requirements and are mandatory for securing electronic services within and between the SAAS 
applications of government institutions and other parties. 
In all case organizations security protocols were used for accessing SAAS applications (T23). 
Protocols used were encrypted (https) and using SSL certificates. 
In all case organization there are also possibility to access SAAS applications via API interfaces (T21). 
In case unauthorized devices are able to access the SAAS application there is a high risk of leaking 
sensitive data (T5). 
 
4.3.5. Deployment of ESA in a SAAS service model 
 
In this section the score and results for the dimension deployment of ESA in a SAAS service model is 
presented. The score is presented in a table. In the table you will find the individual (total) scores as 
well as the combined (total) scores for the surveyed dimension. In addition, you will find the results 
from the semi-structured interviews.    
 
Score: 












5.1 Gebruikt u ESA om de risico's 
van SAAS in kaart te 
brengen/te beheren? 
 
Are you using ESA to 
identify/manage the risks 
of SAAS? 
50% 0% 50% 33,3% 
5.2 Is er een budget voor 
risicobeheer en monitoring 
van SAAS applicaties? 
 
Is there a budget for risk 
management and 
monitoring of SAAS 
applications? 
50% 50% 50% 50% 
5. Risico's worden middels ESA 
in kaart gebracht en beheerd 
 
Risks are mapped and 
managed through ESA 
50% 25% 50% 41,7% 
Table 6 Use of ESA in a SAAS service model score 
Result: 
All respondents confirmed that elements of ESA were used within their case organizations to identify 
and manage risks for SAAS applications (T8, T29). The usage was based on ad-hoc requirements from 
management and/or from regulation/compliance point of view. In all researched organizations there 
was no roadmap for ESA. Also, there was only a limited use (T8) of SAAS related service portfolio 
(T24, T25, T26).  One respondent stated that “there is no usage of a service portfolio with regards to 
risk and security for SAAS at all”. 
All respondents confirmed that there was a limited budget for risk management and monitoring of 
applications, including SAAS (T26, T1, T24). None of the respondents could give an indication on the 
percentage of the budget that was dedicated for SAAS. For all three case organizations there was no 
ESA related governance setup for SAAS (T24, T29, T1). One respondent mentioned that “there is no 
specific role or function that is dedicated for monitoring of SAAS applications within our SME 
organization, this work is done as part of a regular job profile”.  
  




5. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations 
 
This chapter contains a discussion of the outcomes. What do the results mean, what is the position 
of these results in relation to the literature and what is it we have actually learned from the results.  
 
5.1. Discussion – reflection and limitations 
 
5.1.1. Discussion - reflection 
 
Using the survey and interview results we can discuss and reflect the implications for the dimensions 
defined in chapter four: what is the position of these scores and results in relation to the literature 
and what is it we have actually learned. Reflections are linked to the most important themes as 
identified in Appendix G.  
The following figure gives an overview of the combined scores per dimension. These scores are 
discussed in the next sections. 
 
Figure 4 Overview of combined score per dimension 
 
Compliance and Regulation  
 
The respondents are confident that the SAAS solution complies with compliance and regulations 
(high total survey score 77,8% (figure 4), positive interview answers). The SAAS providers provide 
their customers (extensively or not) with information about annual audits and possible certifications, 
with which they try to demonstrate their compliance. Encryption is used by all SAAS providers, 
especially for transport/communication of data and usually also for the storage of data. The data in 
the SAAS application is in all cases solely used in accordance with the original intended purpose. 
SAAS users however rely largely on the information provided by the SAAS providers to fund their 
statements about compliance of the SAAS applications. The SAAS users themselves are subjected to 




an annual audit of the organization, although this audit may focus more on the user organization 
and its local applications and less on the use of SAAS applications. 
 The adoption of SAAS has some barriers, and one of these is issues regarding compliance, privacy 
and legal matters (Hashizume et al. 2013). One of the top-level cloud security requirements is that 
the SAAS application must ensure regulatory compliance (Rath et al. 2019).  
Results show that SMEs do not hesitate in using SAAS applications, as they rely on the compliance 
information from the SAAS providers and the successful audits. This can be related to the finding 
that the importance of trust in the cloud computing context has been repeatedly highlighted due to 
the lack of transparency surrounding cloud offerings, and customers’ inability to fully audit cloud 
services (van der Werff, Fox, Masevic, Emeakaroha, Morrison, and Lynn 2019). 
(This can be linked to theme T1, T5, T11). 
 
Identification, Authentication and Authorization  
 
The respondents are confident that the SAAS solution meets identification, authentication and 
authorization requirements (high total survey score 83,3% (figure 4), positive interview answers). 
Users of the SAAS application(s) have to authenticate themselves. Most SAAS applications use 2FA 
for identification and authentication, but there are also SAAS applications that can be accessed with 
only login name and password. All of the case organizations have a policy and guidelines for access 
and usage (authorization) of SAAS applications. However, two case organizations report that there 
are SAAS applications in which the user identity cannot be confirmed. Some SAAS applications that 
are only used with login name and password (no use of 2FA) are vulnerable for hacking and phishing. 
 The authentication method is the main factor of preserving security and privacy of each 
communication in cloud computing (Purohit and Rana 2016). If authentication and identification is 
not secure, the SAAS user may have problems when data (medical, financial data) is leaked. This can 
lead to fines by the Dutch Data Protection Authority and the AFM. In addition, SAAS users very often 
process data of their own customers in the SAAS application. These customers may be able to claim 
damages if their data are leaked. 
As a best practice, any of the multifactor authentication mechanism in association with the 
traditional credential-based authentication must be used (Indu, Anand, and Bhaskar 2018).  
Yubico research reveals more than three quarters of enterprises in the UK, France and Germany are 
undervaluing Two-Factor Authentication. The research was conducted with 3,006 employees at large 
organizations (250+ employees), who have worked from home at some stage and have work issued 
devices in the UK, France and Germany between February 19, 2021 and March 3, 2021.  
(Yubico 2021) 
The results show that there are policy and guidelines for most of the SAAS applications and that they 
are accessed with a multifactor (2FA) authentication mechanism, but there are some exceptions. 
The fact that 2FA in some cases is not used is confirmed by recent research: despite 2FA technology 
being the best line of defense to protect against account takeovers, only 22% of respondents report 
their company has introduced it since the pandemic began (Yubico 2021). Furthermore, results show 
that authentication and identification are also not always secured enough. This is also in alignment 
with the findings that SAAS providers need to ensure the security and privacy in order to overcome 
threats such as broken authentication since the huge amount of personal and sensitive data will be 
moved to the cloud platform (Subashini and Kavitha 2011). 
(This can be linked to theme T4, T5, T13). 
 




Operational maintenance and Administration 
 
The respondents have only limited confidence that SAAS solutions meet the requirements of 
operational maintenance and administration (medium total survey score 66,7% (figure 4), neutral 
interview answers).  
However in our results two questions were removed, because the respondents were unable to 
answer the questions. As a result, the total score does not give a good indication of the average level 
of operational maintenance in the three case organizations.  
The availability of the SAAS applications is guaranteed, but in some cases not to the maximum. In 
some cases, there is only limited operational uptime. This may lead to failure of core activities. This 
is a key topic within healthcare industry. CSPs have diversion options to other server locations. This 
is also stated in SLAs. SAAS Customers are doubting whether providers inform them directly about 
detected vulnerabilities or leaks in an application (news reports show that CSPs usually only disclose 
leaks after some time). In the Netherlands you must report a data breach to the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority within 72 hours of discovery of the leak. But if no privacy relevant data is lost, 
there is no obligation to report the security incident to the authorities or to the SAAS customers 
(Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens Groep gegevensbescherming artikel 29 2018). 
Denial-of-service is the common attack in cloud and maintaining availability of the cloud services in 
the face of distributed denial-of-service attacks is important to ensure proper service for users (Rath 
et al. 2019). Since cloud services are delivered using classical network protocols and formats over 
the Internet, implicit vulnerabilities existing in these protocols, as well as threats introduced by 
newer architectures, raise many security and privacy concerns (Modi et al. 2013). The number of 
security vulnerabilities in the cloud is more than in traditional enterprise services (Niu et al. 2016). In 
today’s complex Cloud systems, with multiple endpoints and edge nodes, makes manual daily 
systems administration and security monitoring and analysis difficult if not entirely impossible (Rath 
et al. 2019).  
Results show that respondents have confidence in the availability of the SAAS application, but have 
no up to date insights in the amount and severity of security vulnerabilities and threats of the SAAS 
application. They completely rely on the CSP for operational maintenance and administration. 
Therefor SAAS vendors should guarantee security, availability and performance through clear SLA in 
which a common understanding about service, priorities, responsibilities and guarantees between 
service provider and client is determined (Safari, Safari, and Hasanzadeh 2015). 




The respondents have only limited confidence that SAAS solutions meet the architectural 
requirements for security (medium total survey score 66,7% (figure 4), neutral interview answers).  
All case organizations have a limited view of the architecture of the SAAS applications (not all 
providers inform their customers extensively about the technical and logical security related 
infrastructure and systems). The providers do have certificates, such as ISO 27001. The SAAS 
applications are all accessed by encrypted protocols (https) using SSL certificates, which is also 
clearly stated in the SLAs. Vendors and developers must consider key architecture factors for SAAS 
development process to stand in the current competitive environment: these key factors include 
customization, scalability, MTA (Multi-Tenancy Architecture), security, integration, and fault 
tolerance and recovery management (Aleem, Ahmed, Batool, and Khattak 2019).  




Results show that the SAAS CSC have no insights in the technical and logical security architecture of 
the SAAS application. Insights in SAAS architecture are limited to encryption and security protocols 
for accessing the SAAS application. This is in line with findings that customers typically are unaware 
of the network behind a SAAS-solution, as they only deal with the SAAS-provider. The customer pays 
the SAAS provider who in turn pays the different parties involved to deliver its service (Van Velzen, 
De Jong, and Jansen 2019:8). The availability of SAAS applications relies on the robustness of the 
SAAS-provider and its underlying parties. With every additional party there are more places the 
network could “break”, increasing the chance of business interruption (Van Velzen et al. 2019:9). 
(This can be linked to theme T20).  
  
Deployment of ESA in a SAAS service model 
The respondents have only limited confidence that the SAAS risks and security controls are mapped 
and managed through ESA (low total score 41,7% (figure 4), neutral interview answers). 
ESA is used to a very limited extent in all organizations to identify the risks and security controls of 
SAAS. The use of ESA-related functions within the organizations is limited to the deployment of a 
data management officer (probably motivated by the legal obligation under the GDPR). Other 
functions/roles are carried out jointly to a limited extent by an ICT administrator/manager (from the 
point of view of cost savings/low budget). There is no ESA related governance. A limited budget is 
available for risk and security management. There are no specific ESA functions/roles with regards to 
SAAS. Within an SME a system administrator does this work periodically. 
A key part of defining the enterprise architecture team is establishing the expected role and 
mandate of the security architect. Best practice security architecture integrates security and risk 
within all domains. Integral to this is establishing the governance process for the security 
architecture within the context of the enterprise architecture governance process (The open group 
2016).  
From the results it is recognized that in none of the researched case organizations there is a typical 
governance setup, nor a dedicated security architect with regards to ESA in a SAAS service model. 
There is only a limited budget available for security and risk issues. The major risk in risk 
management is that a risk occurs and there is not enough time in the schedule or money in the 
budget (Westcott 2005). 
(This can be linked to theme T8, T24, T26, T29). 
 
5.1.2. Discussion - limitations 
 
Because of the coronavirus outbreak the initial case organization had to cancel participation in the 
research at the last minute. During a new search for a case organization, three SME case 
organization could be identified for participation in the research. This resulted in change from a 
single-case study to a multi-case study approach, and several adjustments in research setup had to 
be made. Because of this also a smaller number of respondents was interviewed than originally 
anticipated, which could lead to less substantiated data. The timeframe for arranging and executing 
the data collection, and the data analysis was squeezed and became even more time critical.   
 For data collection a mixed method was used. This mixed method consists of two parts. Part 1  
(quantitative): a survey approach for the main questions. For this a score template was developed in 




order to be able to collect a score per main question. Part 2 (qualitative): a semi-structured 
interview approach with open questions to corroborate the related survey questions. The open 
detail questions should substantiate and underpin the score of the main question. 
Another issue was finding a suitable data analysis technique for the qualitative part. Due to the 
smaller number of respondents (three) the usage of thematic analysis was not recommended. A 
minimum of four respondents is required to make this technique efficient (Ose 2016). Another 
disadvantage of thematic analysis is that although there are numerous examples of how to conduct 
qualitative research, there are few discussions in the literature about how to conduct a rigorous and 
relevant thematic analysis (Nowell, Norris, White, and Moules 2017).  While thematic analysis is 
flexible, this flexibility can lead to inconsistency and a lack of coherence when developing themes 
derived from the research data (Holloway and Todres 2003). There is no clear agreement about how 
researchers can rigorously apply this method (Nowell et al. 2017).  
Thematic analysis seems to be almost equivalent to labeling/coding and categorizing by theme in the 
literature, but there are many techniques for finding themes (Ryan and Bernard 2003). Since the 
textual data consisted of brief descriptions a different technique, based on finding similarities and 
differences, was used (Ryan and Bernard 2003:102). This technique was supported by an NLP engine 
and made use of an open-source library (Spacy 2021) for advanced NLP (Weiying, Pham, 
Eftekharypour, and Pheng 2019). 
The research setup of this thesis concerned a multi-case study approach. But with the limited 
number of respondents, the most prominent critique factor for this analysis is the issue of external 
validity or generalizability: because of the limited number, the findings cannot be widely accepted. 
Due to restrictions in timing, the literature study was not exhaustive.  Because of this an incomplete 
picture of the investigation of the research topic may occur. 
This research has been executed during the challenging time of the corona pandemic. Because of 
this, participant bias could occur. People may behave differently during an interview (McCambridge, 
Witton, and Elbourne 2014). All meetings were executed via Microsoft Teams (online). This also 
makes it more difficult to exclude participant's bias. 
 
5.2. Conclusions  
 
SAAS allows users to connect to and use cloud-based applications over the Internet. The use of SAAS 
applications continues to grow, making companies more and more dependent on the SAAS CC 
service model in the future. In this thesis we researched to what extent Enterprise Security 
Architecture (ESA) can be used to map/model risk and security controls in a SAAS CC service model 
(RQ).  
To be able to answer this main research question we first had to investigate and answer two sub 
research questions: sub-research Question 1 (RQ1): What is the impact of using the SAAS CC service 
model on risk and security controls and sub-research Question 2 (RQ2): How is ESA being deployed 
in a SAAS CC service model. 
Results from literature research showed that there is only very limited knowledge on the actual use 
of ESA within organizations.  




After conducting a survey/interview session within the selected case organizations, we found that 
the use of SAAS applications can create risks in a number of areas. SAAS applications may have 
compliance uncertainties, security issues or infrastructure flaws that enable unauthorized access to 
sensitive customer data. 
Below table shows per dimension the impact of the use of the SAAS service model on the risk and 
security controls (RQ1) and the implications thereof for the use of ESA by the SAAS customer (RQ), 
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Table 7 SAAS service model impact and use of ESA 





Below table shows how ESA is generally deployed by the customer (RQ2) and the implications 
thereof for the use of ESA by the customer in a SAAS service model (RQ), based on the discussion of 
the researched data (bottom-up approach). 
  






Budget for risk management 
 
ESA governance setup 
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complicates the use of ESA for risk 
and security controls in a SAAS CC 
service model. This also limits setup 
of roles and responsibilities to 
manage ESA related artifacts 
How is ESA being 
deployed (RQ2) 
 
Limited resources and capabilities  
involved in risk and security 
management 
 
(Elements of) ESA is used to a very 
limited extent by the CSC 
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research data 
Limited budget available for risk 
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Table 8 SAAS service model ESA deployment 
 
Customers should use ESA to identify the risks of utilizing the SAAS service model and define the 
controls to manage the risks:  
• Trust of the SAAS customer in the compliance of the SAAS provider is high. But actual results 
show that no (elements of) ESA are in place to check and confirm this trust. The CSC can use 
ESA tools and methods to guarantee and monitor compliance with regulation. 
• Although SAAS customers have a big confidence, the authentication and identification 
methods are not always secure enough. This could have a big impact on risk and security 
controls of the SAAS applications. The elements of identification, authentication and 
authorization can be setup and monitored with ESA. 
• SAAS customers have no up-to-date insights in the amount and severity of security 
vulnerabilities and threats detected in the operational maintenance of the SAAS application. 
They completely rely on the CSP. ESA can't be used by the CSC to implement the controls 
needed to manage the risks. These controls are the responsibility of the SAAS CSP. 
• The SAAS customer has no insights in the technical and logical architecture of the SAAS 
application. When SAAS users have no insight in the architecture, they cannot gain insight in 
the possible vulnerabilities of the SAAS application. The CSC can't use ESA to implement the 
controls needed to manage the security. These controls are the responsibility of the SAAS 
CSP. 
• ESA is deployed to a limited extent by the CSC. In none of the researched customer 
organizations there is a typical governance setup nor a dedicated security architect with 




regards to ESA. A small CSC budget for risk management and the limited use of ESA in 
general by the CSC prevents extensive deployment of ESA for a SAAS CC service model.  
Both the CSP and the CSC possess responsibility in securing the cloud and minimizing the risk. Shared 
responsibility does not mean less responsibility. Within a SAAS service model the CSP will cover 
many aspects of physical, infrastructure, and application security while the CSC remains responsible 
for certain areas of security and control like compliance, user access and data. The CSC can use ESA 
to manage the areas of security and control for which he remains responsible, although the current 
limited use of ESA provides a poor basis for managing the risks of the SAAS CC service model. 
 
5.3. Recommendations for practice  
 
It is recommended to create awareness in an SME in the area of risk and security when using SAAS 
applications.  
Within an SME currently there often is limited budget and capacity. This leads to a gap with regards 
to implementing ESA or elements of ESA in general and specifically for SAAS. It is recommended to 
plan for budget and capacity with regards to ESA related activities. 
It is recommended to have one Single Point of Contact within the CSC for risk and security issues, 
including SAAS.  
Management buy-in and management approval for ESA or elements of ESA is key and 
recommended. 
When using (elements of) ESA, it is recommended to install monitoring artifacts in such a way that  
ESA continues to be updated and improved. 
 
5.4. Recommendations for further research  
 
This research was exploratory and performed in three different SME case organizations within three 
different industry types (healthcare, accountancy, governmental). Despite the fact that it was 
executed as a multi-case research, it still has limited generalizability, providing opportunities for 
subsequent research.  
 
From conclusions it is recognized that there is a shared responsibility between CSP and CSC. But it is 
not clear for the CSC what his responsibility is. This seems to be a common problem as also stated by 
a survey of Palo Alto Networks. The state of Cloud Native Security based on a survey of 3,000 
professionals in cloud architecture, shows that 73% of organizations report being unsure about 
where their CSP responsibility for securing cloud workloads stops and where theirs begins (Palo alto 
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2FA  2 Factor Authentication 
AVG  Algemene Verordening Gegevensbescherming (see GDPR) 
CC  Cloud Computing 
CCM  Cloud Controls Matrix 
CSA  Cloud Security Alliance  
CSC  Cloud Service Customer 
CSP  Cloudl Service Provider 
EA  Enterprise Architecture 
ESA  Enterprise Security Architecture 
ENISA  European Network and Information Security Agency 
GDPR   General Data Protection Regulation 
IAAS  Infrastructure As A Service 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization 
NCSC  Nationaal Cyber Security Centrum 
NEN  Dutch standard (NEderlandse Norm) 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NLP  Natural Language Processing 
PAAS  Platform As A Service 
SAAS  Software As A Service 
SLA  Service Level Agreement 









Appendix A: Overview of case organization 
 
Case organization 1: 
Case organization 1 is a healthcare provider for plannable medical care in the Netherlands. Case 
organization 1  focusses on treatments in skin care, and is covered by the Dutch health insurance 
system. Additionally, case organization 1 offers specialist care in other area’s, like Phlebology and 
Lymphology. 
Case organization 1 office is located in the south of the Netherlands and employs around 40 people, 
of which 1 in the ICT department. 
 
Case organization 2: 
Case organization 2 is a Dutch accountancy company that delivers a wide range of accounting and 
fiscal/legal services to ensure that the client’s requirements in accounting, bookkeeping, 
administration, payroll and tax advisory are met. 
Case organization 2 office is located in the south of the Netherlands and employs around 40 people, 
of which 1 in the ICT department. 
 
Case organization 3: 
Case organization 3 is an ICT service provider for several public institutions that form a part of the 
city-region of the province of Limburg (NL), an agglomerate with about 25000 inhabitants and 
encompassing 8 municipalities.    









Appendix B: Overview of respondents 
Name Role Relation with ESA/SAAS 
Respondent 1 ICT manager/ICT administrator Single Point of Contact for 
security and risk controls, 
Administrator for SAAS 
applications, assistant for 
audits 
Respondent 2 ICT administrator Administrator for SAAS 
applications, Network and 
infrastructure (security) 
administrator 
Respondent 3 ICT administrator/technical 
application manager 
Technical application manager 
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Introduction: 10 minutes 
In preparation of the survey/interview, the respondent is given a brief explanation of the purpose of 
the survey/interview, the structure of the interview, the contribution expected from the 
respondents, the guidelines and privacy issues, the way that data is being collected and how data is 
being reported. (survey/interview and reports will be in Dutch language.) 
 
Purpose: 
General information about study course, student and purpose of survey/interview is given. 
 
Structure: 
During the survey closed questions are asked for the defined dimensions. The purpose for this is to 
have pre-defined answers to save time during the interview. During the semi-structured interview  
open questions are asked to corroborate the answers on the survey questions. The semi-structured 




Short explanation on how respondents will contribute to the research. 
 
Guidelines and privacy issues: 
• It is not mandatory to answer on questions, and there is always the option to stop the 
survey/interview 
• The structure of the research is that per research element the practical situation of your own 
organization is looked at. This is done with closed survey questions and semi-structured 
interview questions.  
• The results are processed anonymously and cannot be traced back. 
• After agreement with the respondent the interview can be recorded, this to support validity 
and reliability of the research. 
Data collection: 
• Results are anonymized 
• Analyzed and anonymized data will be made public, data cannot be traced back to persons 
or organization. 
Reporting: 
• All reports are anonymized 
• Anonymized reports will be send to the respondent for review 
• Final anonymized report will be send to the respondent 
 
Interview: 45 min 
 
During the interview the interview questions are discussed and checked for applicability in case-
organization. Interview questions are in Dutch and are split up in following sections: 
 
 








Closing: 5 minutes 
At the end the respondent is being thanked for participation in this research and for providing 
additional information. 
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CC =  Cloud Computing 
ESA = Enterprise Security Architecture 
SAAS = Software As A Service 
CSP = Cloud Service Provider 












Wat is uw positie binnen de organisatiestructuur? 
Hoe groot is de organisatie? 
Kunt u uw rol toelichten? 
 
Definities 
Enterprise Security Architecture (ESA) is de praktijk van het toepassen van methoden voor het 
beschrijven van een (huidige en/of toekomstige) structuur van beveiligingsprocessen en 
informatiebeveiligingssystemen van een organisatie, zodat ze in overeenstemming zijn met de 
doelstellingen en de strategische richting van de organisatie. 
Is deze definitie herkenbaar? Indien niet: wat is volgens u ESA?   
 
Cloud computing (CC)is het via een netwerk – vaak het internet – op aanvraag beschikbaar stellen 
van hardware, software en gegevens, ongeveer zoals elektriciteit uit het lichtnet. 
Is deze definitie herkenbaar? Indien niet: wat is volgens u Cloud Computing?  
 
Software as a service (SAAS), ook weleens software on demand genoemd, is software die als een 
online dienst wordt aangeboden. De klant hoeft de software niet aan te schaffen, maar sluit 
bijvoorbeeld een contract per maand per gebruiker af. 




Zijn doelstellingen voor ESA (risk en security controls) gekend en in documenten geformaliseerd? 
Hoe helpt uw team bij het bereiken van de doelstellingen. 
In hoeverre heeft u te maken gehad met incidenten betreffende risk en security? 
 
 
Ervaring SAAS en ESA 
Met welke SAAS-applicaties heeft u al gewerkt? 
Welke risk & security controls, gericht op SAAS, zijn er aanwezig binnen de organisatie? 
Worden er standaarden/methodes/frameworks gebruikt voor inzet van ESA? 
 
Dimensies 





1. Compliance en regelgeving 
 








1.1.1. Welk type gegevens worden er verwerkt binnen de SAAS-oplossing? 
1.1.2. Welke specifieke regelgevingen gelden er voor uw branche/bedrijf ten aanzien van locatie, 
toegang, opslag en verwerking van data?  
1.1.3. Wat is de impact voor de organisatie als regelgeving niet wordt nageleefd? 
1.1.4. Vinden er periodiek audits plaats bij de CSP en bij de eigen organisatie? 
1.1.5. Zijn de audits van de CSP beschikbaar voor inzage?  
 
 
1.2. Worden gegevens in de SAAS applicatie(s) uitsluitend gebruikt of verwerkt in overeenstemming 







1.2.3. Wordt dit gegarandeerd door de CSP? 
 
 













1.3.1. Wat zijn de gevolgen voor de organisatie als de encryptie niet veilig is? 
1.3.2. Zijn er afspraken met de CSP en hoe zijn deze vastgelegd? 
 
 
2. Identificatie, authenticatie en autorisatie 
 







2.1.1. Welke authenticatie methode(s) worden gebruikt voor de aanmelding bij SAAS-applicaties? 
2.1.2. Welk beleid geldt er bij eerste aanmelding (zelf aanmelden, op uitnodiging)? 
2.1.3. Wat zijn de mogelijke gevolgen voor de organisatie als applicatie authenticatie niet veilig is? 
 









2.2.1. Hoe wordt de identiteit van de gebruiker vastgesteld? 
2.2.2. Wat zijn de gevolgen voor de organisatie als vaststelling niet juist is?   
 
 











2.3.1. Waar is dit beleid vastgelegd en hoe wordt dit gecontroleerd?  
2.3.2. Wat zijn de gevolgen voor de organisatie als dit niet correct gebeurt? 
2.3.3. Hoe is de organisatie van autorisatie ingericht (werken met super-users, gewone users, …)? 
2.3.4. Worden super-user accounts gecontroleerd? 
 
3. Operationeel beheer en administratie 
 








3.1.1. Hoe wordt beschikbaarheid behouden in geval van cyber aanvallen? 
3.1.2. Is er een uitwijkmogelijkheid naar een andere server-locatie in geval van calamiteiten? 
3.1.3 Wat zijn de gevolgen voor de organisatie al er geen beschikbaarheid van de SAAS applicatie is? 
 
 







3.2.1. Zijn er automatische detectiesystemen voor kwetsbaarheden?  
3.2.2. Hoe wordt de gebruiker/klant op de hoogte gebracht/gehouden?  
 











3.3.1. Welke security elementen worden in de SLA beschreven? 













4.1.1. Hoe zijn de componenten van de SAAS Cloud-applicatiearchitectuur met elkaar verbonden (via 
lokaal datacentrum of internet)? 
4.1.2. Is de applicatie naast de gebruikelijke user interface ook via web-API-eindpunten te 
benaderen? 
4.1.3. Wat is de impact indien ongeautoriseerde apparaten zich kunnen aanmelden bij de SAAS-
applicatie(s)? 
 










4.2.1. Welke certificaten zijn er? 
4.2.2. Worden de certificaten ook periodiek vernieuwd? 
 
4.3. Wordt de SAAS applicatie benaderd via beveiligingsprotocollen? 













4.3.1. Welke beveiligingsprotocollen worden er gebruikt? 
4.3.2. Zijn deze beveiligingsprotocollen ook onderdeel van een SLA? 
 
 
5. Toepassing van ESA 
 




3 Helemaal niet 
 
 
5.1.1. Zijn er functies/rollen in de organisatie die gerelateerd zijn aan ESA (CISO, security officer, 
Functionaris gegevensbeheer, …) mbt SAAS? 
5.1.2. Zijn er richtlijnen en principes voor implementatie van ESA bij SAAS? 
5.1.3. Beschikt de case organisatie over een service portfolio (ISM/ITIL), waarin risk en security zaken 
mbt SAAS worden meegenomen?  
 
 





3 Helemaal niet 
 
 





5.2.1. Zijn er medewerkers die uitsluitend belast zijn met beheer en monitoring van risk en security 
















Appendix E: Survey score 
 
 

















































































Columns Color Meaning 
Spacy12, Spacy23, Spacy13 Red Difference for pair comparison 
Spacy12, Spacy23, Spacy13 Yellow Low similarity for pair comparison 
Spacy12, Spacy23, Spacy13 Green High similarity for pair comparison 
Similarities/Differences Red Difference for total of pairs 
Similarities/Differences White Low similarity for total of pairs 
Similarities/Differences Green High similarity for total of pairs 
 
  




Appendix G: Theme count 
 
Theme nr Theme Count 
T1 Small and Medium sized Enterprise 4 
T2 Clear understanding of definition 3 
T3 ESA goals 1 
T4 policy and guidelines for access and usage of SAAS applications 4 
T5 sensitive data leak 10 
T6 Core business SAAS application 1 
T7 Risk & security controls 1 
T8 ESA is used to a very limited extent 6 
T9 strict regulations for access and data storage 2 
T10 subject to periodic audits 2 
T11 relied on the compliance information from the certified SAAS CSP 4 
T12 Privacy 1 
T13 electronic authentication of humans in a SAAS application was a problem 8 
T14 Available registration policy 2 
T15 Availability of SAAS applications was a crucial aspect 4 
T16 Availability of fail-over 1 
T17 not clear if there was any ability of detection of vulnerabilities that could impact SAAS applications 2 
T18 doubting whether providers inform them directly about detected vulnerabilities or leaks 1 
T19 security elements in the SLA 3 
T20 limited picture of architecture of the SAAS applications 4 
T21 Multiple acces possibilities 1 
T22 providers do have certificates 3 
T23 security protocols were used for accessing SAAS 3 
T24 no specific role or function that is dedicated for monitoring of SAAS 5 
T25 limited use of service portfolio (ISM/ITIL) 1 




T26 limited budget for risk management and monitoring of applications 6 
T27 limited operational up time 1 
T28 not clear what kind of certificates were used 1 
T29 no ESA related governance 5 
T30 limited confidence that SAAS solutions meet the requirements 1 
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